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I. INTRODUCTIN
Our established civil procedure rules permit.a plaintiff to invoke
varied temporary remedies before the trial takes place. The best
known pretrial writ is still attachment, but many others are at
times available, ranging from body arrest or claim and delivery to
Uis pendens or receivership.' These writs are very powerful because
they are still easy to obtain, take prompt effect and may impound
defendants' property for years until the plaintiffs' rights are tested
by a trial. Their effectiveness is demonstrated by the attention they
receive in law reviews and court decisions. Hardly a session of our
legislature passes without some changes in these laws. By these
methods, the formal rules determining the use of writs are shaped
to fit our ever-changing views of public policy.
Once the laws are set, however, we find the published purposes
ignored, and writs becoming tactical weapons of the parties to our
* Partner, Alexander, Inman & Fine, Beverly Hills, California. A.B.,
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1. These writs are under strong judicial attack but the remedy is still
held proper, even though the procedure has been ruled unconstitutional.
See, Randone v. Appellate Dept., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971)
and cases cited. Our courts may hereafter eliminate the substance of vari-
ous writs by holding all procedures to be unconstitutional. The decisions
say, however, that the attack is solely on the issue of a hearing before
writs may be used.
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trials. By their use, litigation sometimes is "little short of at-
tempted extortion, which depends upon method of collection rather
than the merit of the claim to payment."2  The justice of the con-
flict is ignored and cases won by callous economic bludgeoning.
One cannot stand aghast at such practices. They are to be ex-
pected. Lawyers are condottieri in the commercial world. Their
weapons differ from their forebears' of the Renaissance, but not
their tactics or their social purposes. Their object simply is to win,
regardless of the justice of their cause or the social side effects of
victory. Success in the courtroom lottery brings substantial gains,
not only to the litigants but also their attorneys. The stakes in
money, prestige and influence are high. Every incentive, therefore,
exists for an attorney to "fix" his case, through skillful manipulation
of trial court procedures. Improper conduct in this area is unaf-
fected by mere moral indignation. Procedural roadblocks to their
use increase the cost of using writs, but leaves the problems of their
use as pressure tactics unresolved. The correct way to safeguard
society against misuse of such procedures is through institutional
controls which will reduce substantially the scope afforded lawyers
for such manipulation and will penalize severely an offending liti-
gant. Clients who lose their claims because an attorney has used
sharp practices will quickly find a way to discipline the bar.
I. MISUSE OF PRETRIAL WRITS ARISES FROM
OUR LEGAL CONCEPTS
Our statutes and our public policy authorize use of preliminary
remedies only in a comparatively few specific situations; they
should not be invoked in other circumstances. We say that "when
the law . . . designates and specifies in what instances an attach-
ment may issue and in what cases it is not a legal remedy, the ex-
press will of the legislature must control."' 3 But this is. just our
2. Petition of Herbert Aller Business Representative, 298 P.2d 128, 131
(2nd Dist. 1956), affJd sub nom In re Aller's Petition, 47 Cal. 2d 189, 302
P.2d 294 (1956). This case involved resort to the Labor Commission to
help collect a debt. The leading discussion of these problems is Spellens
v. Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d 210, 232-33, 317 P.2d 613, 627 (1957). There the
problem is described as the "use of the process as a threat or club. There
is, in other words, a form of extortion, and it is what is done in the course
of negotiation. . . which constitutes the tort." (Emphasis in text).
3. Standard Auto Sales Co., Inc. v. Lehman, 43 Cal. App. 763, 767, 186
P. 178, 180 (3rd Dist. 1919; hear. den.)
rhetoric. The hard fact is that limits set by statute on the use of
pretrial writs are in practice widely circumvented because a skillful
lawyer can find ways to use a writ in almost any commercial case,
regardless of whether it is supposed to be available.
This comes about because our legal doctrines, including those on
which the use of writs are based, do not correspond to actual divi-
sions of human activity. They are artificial models for events,
which like other formal theories,4 themselves establish the pattern
or relationship among observed phenomena. The "facts" in every
situation are consistent with many different legal theories and only
groups of facts viewed in terms of a specific formal concept will ex-
plain to us other yet unclassified events, and determine how such
unknowns should be interpreted.
This may be illustrated easily by a simple arithmetic analogy.
In the progression (1,2,3,n) the unknown term "n" could be 4, 5, 6, 7
or any other conceivable number, depending in the theory (or "set")
selected to establish such a mathematical sequence. Except in
light of the theory chosen, there is no value for "n" which is more
"true" than any other value; "n" could therefore be anything. This
4. K. POPPER, CoNJrcTuRs & REFUTATIONs at 214 (1962): "But in an-
other sense we might say that these facts do not exist as facts before they
are singled out from the continuum of events and pinned down by state-
ments- the theories which describe them." KovEsr, MORAL NOTIONS at 20,
25: "In our language, to be able to understand the significance or the
meaning of a term, we have to be able to follow a rule in using that term,
not to be able to perceive an entity of which our term is a name....
Standards, needs and wants also enter into the formation of terms that we
usually call descriptive terms. What makes a term descriptive is . . .the
point of view from which we organize these and other elements into con-
cepts." Law, of course, has no monopoly here. It is equally true of every
formal body of knowledge. R. WILDER, EVOLUTION Or MATHEMATICAL
CONCEPTS at 108: "Certain parts of mathematics are labeled 'geometry'
. . just as certain parts are labeled 'analysis' and other parts 'algebra'.
But these labels again seem to be a matter of words and their conven-
tions .... Although labels are convenient and quite useful in their proper
context, they should not be allowed to conceal underlying facts."
5. The starting number 1, is given in each case. The sequence 1, 2, 3,
n, for any value of n can be derived from the general formula y = (n-3)
(14-3n)x (n-4)x 2
+ + , when x equals the last known term in the sequence
2 2
and y the unknown which follows it. From the main formula we can
derive the sequence 1,2,3,4,5 by the special formula y = l+x. The se-
quence, 1,2,3,5,7 is a list of primes, treating 1 as a prime. 1,2,3,5,12 can be
derived by the special formula y 2- (%)x + (%)x 2. The sequence
1,2,3,6,27 is derived from the formula y = 3-2x+x 2 . The sequence
1,2,3,7,53 is derived by the formula y = 4-(7/2)x + (3/2)x 2. Any other
special formula desired can come from the general formula listed above.
Appreciation is expressed to Peter L. Besag, Ph.D. for the foregoing for-
mulas.
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is also true in legal logic.6 Without an overriding concept, no
group of facts selected from the total surrounding events can lead
to any fixed conclusion, or give the legal "n". This is true whether
the issue is state of mind, unavoidable accident, reasonable reliance,
due process, testamentary intent or any of the other catchwords
about which lawyers fight interminably. Since "n" will vary with
the theory used, one can also reverse the process, determine first
the outcome that is sought, and then produce a theory giving that
result. This is the game that lawyers really play. They usually
assume the end they wish, and then evolve a legal doctrine going
there. That is why the "same" acts are so easily described in
doctrines from the field of torts or trusts or contracts or of crimes.
They are all one, with different emphases. In order to analyze,
describe or even just to understand events, they must be related to
systems. Such systems, however, are not less artifical because of
this analytic necessity.
In practice, this makes it easy for a plaintiff to argue several legal
"sets" at once, and plead his cause in varied ways, hoping to find
thereby at least one which will be accepted by the courtroom judge
and become the basis for his victory. Nor is there anything wrong
in urging many theories at one time. A litigant should not be pre-
maturely bound to any single concept of his rights or forced to
"gamble on his remedy" before he knows the outcome of the trial.
7
6. S. Toummvm, THE UsEs oF ARGUMENT at 7, 8 (1958) refers to logic as
"generalized jurisprudence" and described lawsuits as "just a special kind
of rational dispute, for which the procedure and rules of argument have
hardened into institutions." Certainly, law employs a type of proof or
justification quite different, for example, from scientific proof or from
determination of matters by force, and is therefore well adapted to resolve
certain kinds of social problems, although many other problems are far
beyond it.
7. Klinger v. Modesto Fruit Co., 107 Cal. App. 97, 103, 290 P. 127, 129
(3rd Dist. 1930; hear. den.)
The doctrine of election, whether it be applied to the selection of
optional courses of procedure or the choice of individuals who are
deemed to be severally liable for an obligation, is intended for the
benefit of the parties charged. Obviously this defense may
therefore be waived by them .... An election is in fact the exer-
cise of a choice of optional remedies or debtors .... It is
illogical and unjust to require a creditor on his own initiative
and without a demand or motion to make an election.... This
would require him to speculate upon the decision of the court.
... An election before the rendition of judgment might not ac-
cord with the court's view of the relationship as disclosed by evi-
dence. A premature choice might result in an erroneous selec-
The voluntary use of pretrial writs in this situation, however, is
very different and raises other policy considerations, because the
rights of the defendants are severely affected by them.
The situation often comes about that one of several legal ways
to view events permits a pretrial remedy not available when the
same facts are organized under another doctrine. The same fact sit-
uation, for example, can be described in language of either tort or
contract. In each such case, the plaintiff's lawyer is greatly
tempted to phrase his claim so as to take advantage of a writ. He
does this by including within his pleadings a theory permitting pre-
trial remedies, or even by deliberately inventing such a claim, while
also making other arguments based on theories under which the
writ could not be used. The writ is then employed, with all the
pressures that flow from its use. In most cases the dispute is set-
tled, perhaps because of the employment of the writ. If, however,
agreement is not reached and the trial eventually takes place,
the plaintiff may find that he cannot win on the claim with which
he invoked the writ, and must seek recovery upon some non-writ
theory. Such conduct is indefensible. It deliberately evades and
mocks the limitations permitted by statute on the use of writs. That
an "attachment may not issue in an action founded on tort"8 is as
much part of our law and public policy as that one may issue in a
contract case 9, and this is true no matter how improperly the de-
fendant may have acted. However "just" the plaintiff's case, his
tion and a total loss of a valid claim... The uncertainty and
injustice of an erroneous election is apparent. The law will not
require a litigant to gamble on his remedy.
Of course, a plaintiff "may not pursue both [theories] to a final judgment,
but must instead prior to that event elect between the inconsistent reme-
dies previously pleaded." Thorson v. Western Development Corporation,
251 Cal. App. 2d 206, 214, 59 Cal. Rptr. 209, 304 (4th Dist. 1967).
8. Stowe v. Matson, 94 Cal. App. 2d 678, 683, 211 P.2d 591, 594 (3rd
Dist. 1949; hear. den.). Attachment traditionally has been permitted in
certain tort cases.
9. Sniadach does not eliminate attachments; Randone merely holds our
present statute unconstitutional, but a revised statute could constitu-
tionally permit attachments "generally after notice and a hearing on the
probable validity of a creditor's claim". In Blain v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258,
96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971) the court held the present claim and delivery stat-
ute unconstitutional, but also ruled that "in order to create a constitu-
tional prejudgment replevin remedy, there must be a provision for a de-
termination of probable cause by a magistrate and for a hearing prior to
any seizure. . . ." These cases do not go to the remedy, but are appar-
ently solely procedural. Of course, the courts could effectively eliminate
all such writs by holding every implementing procedure to be unconstitu-
tional, while merely giving lip service to the continued use of writs.
There is no reason, however, to doubt that the courts mean what they say
in these cases, and that most writs may constitutionally be used and will
be with us for many years to come.
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misuse of the process of the court must be stopped. This type of
abuse of the writ procedures is rampant in our courts. Effective
methods must be found to combat such practices.
III. ESTABLISHED REMEDIES ARE NOT ENOUGH
The traditional ways to penalize a plaintiff for misuse of a pro-
visional remedy have all proved insufficient. The defendant usu-
ally must bring a second lawsuit when the first is finally over, with
all of the attendant delays, uncertainties, and cost. In most situa-
tions the wronged defendant must win the first suit as a condition
to bringing the second, although a victorious plaintiff is as likely to
have used a writ improperly as one who loses the first suit.
A second suit is not an effective solution. Not only does it fur-
ther burden our overcrowded courts, but it is not a useful way to
stop abuses. This kind of recovery must be based on malice, bad
motives or extreme overreaching, and these claims are most diffi-
cult to prove. The threat of retaliation by a later tort suit for mis-
use of a provisional remedy has not controlled plaintiffs in this field
and is not regarded as a serious issue in settlement negotiations,
which further shows what little use they are. Even a defendant
who successfully resisted the plaintiff's claims initially, wins little
by his second suit. In cases where the plaintiff wins the initial ac-
tion, the later tort claim for procedural abuse against the successful
plaintiff is almost worthless.10
10. The plaintiff is not liable for a statutory wrongful attachment claim,
but only for a tort such as malicious attachment, as a result of a highly
misguided claim of public policy. Asevedo v. Orr, 100 Cal. 293, 34 P. 777
(1893). When a bond is posted, the defendant may proceed against the
surety. This type of suit is not a sufficient answer. A successful defend-
ant may have a meaningless remedy against the surety because an in-
sufficient bond was posted or the sureties are insolvent and because relief
on any bond is rarely adequate. Still, a suit on the plaintiff's bond is
usually of some value, although this area is badly in need of reform.
A more detailed discussion of some of these problems is contained in
Alexander, Wrongful Attachment Damages, U. SAN FRANCISco L. REV. 38
(1969). A tort claim for abuse of a preliminary remedy is sometimes
available as a cross-complaint in the original suit, without waiting until
the first judgment. White Lighting Company v. Wolfson, 68 Cal. 2d 336,
66 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1968). This practice should be encouraged and ex-
panded as much as possible, as it would afford great relief. Malicious
prosecution, for example, should also be made available as a counterclaim.
Unfortunately, Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179
Another way proposed to end such practices is to demand high
standards of the bar, and punish lawyers who offend by censure,
fines or even terms in jail. Such a proposal, while dramatic, is not
meaningful. Abuse of writs is too widespread for such a cure to
work, and censure calls for even greater proof than tort.1 '
Limitations on the use of special writs is another answer regu-
larly proposed.12 Restrictions on ex parte writ procedures18 and
the many court hearings regularly available reflect this pressure
for judicial supervision.
Two very different approaches can be noticed here. Some writs
are altogether banned and held invalid under any circumstances.
They just cannot be used again. Other courts permit the writ to is-
sue following a formal judicial hearing. Although the initial ef-
fect of such rulings may be the same, they are very different in
theory and in eventual social implications. Neither approach, how-
ever, will really solve the problems of abuse of writs.
(.1971) seems to emasculate the highly beneficial Wolfson rule. At least the
policy considerations seem inconsistent. A second suit generally comes
too late and is too expensive to be an effective remedy. If the plaintiff
wins at the first trial, even though on a completely different theory, few
take a defendant's subsequent complaints about procedural abuse seri-
ously. Pete v. Norberg, 163 Cal. App. 2d 154, 329 P.2d 20 (1st Dist. 1958);
Coy v. Advance Automatic Sales Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 313, 39 Cal. Rptr.
476 (1st Dist. 1964; hear. den.) Even when the defendant does win at
first, he has difficulties collecting through a second trial. In Lerner v.
Glickfield, 187 Cal. App. 2d 514, 9 Cal. Rptr. 686 (2nd Dist. 1960; hear.
den.) it took about seven years before the plaintiff finally won. Few
litigants can afford such stamina.
11. THE AunucAN BAR ASsoCIATIoN CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs,
Canon 30 (1908) states that an attorney will not participate in a suit "to
harass or to injure" a defendant. CALIFORIA RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT, Rule 13 (1970) is to the same effect, and is sometimes applied.
Bryant v. State Bar of California, 21 Cal. 2d 285, 131 P.2d 523 (1942).
Such claims are rare, although a lawyer might be held liable for tort dam-
ages resulting from his conduct of the litigation, as in Munson v. Linnick,
255 Cal. App. 2d 589, 63 Cal. Rptr. 340 (4th Dist. 1967). We now recog-
nize a good faith reliance on advice of counsel as a defense to a tort claim.
Brinkley v. Appleby, 276 Cal. App. 2d 244, 80 Cal. Rptr. 734 (2nd Dist.
1969) (but see Templeton Feed and Grain v. Ralston Purina Co., 69 Cal.
2d 461, 72 Cal. Rptr. 344 (1968) ). We cannot control litigation by
threatening the attorney and at the same time hold that the attorney's ad-
vice is a defense in a tort suit against the client.
12. For example, the recently enacted 15 U.S.C. 1671 (1964) et seq.
The general exemption laws are typical of state statutes of this type.
13. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337
(1969), and subsequent state cases, collected in Randone, supra n.1. See
CAL. CODE OF Civ. Pso. §§ 554-558 (West 1954). Rubin v. Barasch, 275
Cal. App. 2d 835, 80 Cal. Rptr. 337 (2nd Dist. 1969) shows how releasing
attached property without a hearing may prove as dangerous as attaching
in the first place.
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Reducing access to a particular pretrial remedy is a control tech-
nique of limited worth. Exempting only certain assets or a portion
of one's earnings does not prevent seizure of remaining property
or impounding the balance of the wages due.14 Eliminating some
writs is not enough, since "pseudo-attachments"'5 or other formal
pretrial remedies will often yield the same results. We could, of
course, abolish every writ.' This is unsatisfactory since it would
also end the legitimate use of pretrial remedies, and deprive a
wronged plaintiff of what often is his sole worthwhile redress.
Such considerations, undoubtedly, explain the great attrac-
tion that our judges find in making every act discretionary, and in
eliminating the automatic use of writs. The present law is clearly
heading towards a system where some court must rule on every-
thing and thereby see that "justice" may be done.' 7 This, after
14. This is the point of Sniadach, since the objectionable Wisconsin
Statute exempted up to 50% of accrued wages. Statutes in other states
are similar, but still unconstitutional. Although only wages were involved
in Sniadach, the principles are equally applicable to any use of such a
writ, as held in Randone, and in some other states, as in Larson v. Fether-
stone, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969). The California courts have
now held that all prejudgment levies on wages are absolutely invalid.
McCallop v. Carberry, 1 Cal. 3d 903, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1970). What has
happened here is the creation of a new exemption "statute" by court de-
cree. Similar points appear in Blair, supra note 9 (claim and delivery)
and Kline v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (inkeeper's liens).
15. These are available pretrial remedies which are often privileged
and can be invoked by a creditor without posting a bond or incurring any
obligation towards a successful defendant except, perhaps, in tort. Repos-
session, wage assignments, interpleader, lis pendens, and criminal com-
plaints are of this nature. See, Alexander, Claims in Interpleader, 44
CALIF. ST. B.J. 210 (1969).
16. Clearly pretrial writs are being eliminated by the courts as well as
by statute. Mihans v. Municipal Court for Berkeley-Albany Jud. Dist., 7
Cal. App. 3d 479, 87 Cal. Rptr. 17 (st Dist. 1970) held unconstitutional the
writ of immediate possession authorized by CAL. CODE OF Civ. PRO. § 1166a
(West 1955) despite a prior judicial hearing. Other writs are currently
under attack. It is not likely, however, that all such writs would fall,
although a hearing will probably be required in every case. Pretrial
writs should not be abolished. Although not the subject here, there is a
valid basis for the use of writs. They have an important and respectable
place in our legal procedure, when used properly. There is nothing inher-
ently wrong or immoral in protecting plaintiffs and letting creditors get
paid.
17. Judges sometimes act as though they alone are capable of solving
every social ill. It is not surprising that they feel this way. Every skill
group imperiously claims a special competence to govern. Plato, after all,
all, is the meaning of Sniadach, Randone, and their progeny. It,
however, is not a sufficient solution and will not work.
Let us suppose that all the laws were changed and provisional re-
lief was made dependent on a pre-trial hearing. For the plaintiff to
win at such a hearing, he would have to show proof that he at least
might well prevail when the suit finally comes to trial. Randone
approaches this requirement. In such a legal world, all writs would
be processed as are receiverships today. The total scheme of pre-
trial remedies might even be encased within one single writ, and
tailored to the merits of the controversy by the pretrial judge, after
a proper hearing.
In such event, more judges would be used, more hearings held,
more pleadings written and more legal fees received. Except as
makework for the bar, however, things would still be the same.
Every pretrial remedy now requires a prior showing of the merits
of the plaintiff's cause, either by testimony or ex parte affidavit.' s
Unless the substantive law is also changed, forcing a hearing in
every case would not affect the use of writs. Randone does not pro-
scribe attachments nor attack the use of writs; only their use with-
out a prior judicial hearing is condemned. What significant im-
provement would pretrial hearings make? Defendants rarely go
to court after a garnishment to seek protection of exemption laws or
file a challenge to the sureties.19 If actual impounding of their
funds does not produce response, one can not think that preattach-
ment hearings would. Suppose defendants did appear; what then?
The debt itself is rarely in dispute; and even if it were, the court
would only set a higher bond, permit the pretrial remedy, and pass
the case along for trial. We cannot expect judges to act otherwise
when every case must pass before them in an unending procession
of petty claims.20 Although an occasional defendant might win ab-
believed philosophers should be the kings. What is surprising, though,
is that so many people acquiesce in the judges' imperial claims. We are
in many ways a lawyer-ridden society, in the same sense that other cul-
tures have been priest-ridden. There is no reason for this save our tradi-
tion, because it is not true in other developed industrial countries.
18. E.g., CAL. CODE or Civ. PRo., §§ 481, 510, 527, 538, 566, 1069, 1088,
1107, 1166a, etc. (West 1955).
19. The court in Randone concedes that "at present, if a debtor is aware
of his legal rights and can afford to do without the attached necessity
until he is able to secure release through the courts, a creditor generally
cannot gain the undue leverage afforded by the attachment of such prop-
erty". The point of Randone is that this is not enough. Why does the
court assume that the new procedures will be better?
20. One envisions massive calendars, with hundreds of cases set for
every hour. We can be sure a standard procedure would evolve using
"commissioners" rather than "clerks", with prehearing approval lists,
group oaths, mass testimony, postponement of contested cases and spe-
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solutely at the outset, a hearing in each case is still not justified.
The same relief could otherwise be obtained on the defendant's mo-
tion for a summary dismissal. Our legal system must give speed
and uniformity because of the size of our communities and the great
demands made on our courts. Exceptions to the rules and spe-
cial cases must have a separate hearing at a different time, apart
from the court's ordinary business.
Preattachment hearings would probably become in practice a
kind of exemption hearing held before the property is seized, rather
than after the writ has been returned. The question commonly be-
fore the court would not be if the plaintiff might prevail, but
whether the writ's use might hurt too much. No good can come
from this. Before the fact, no judge can know what assets might
be caught, or how a garnishment would really work or how much
impounding would hurt "excessively". Nor could a plaintiff list
the properties to be attached and hope to find them when the writ
is authorized. Broad principles would have to be employed, since
detailed hearings would seem to be unworkable. In fact, such hear-
ings might even harm impoverished defendants. An Order to Show
Cause why an Attachment Should Not Lie would, no doubt, be
served along with the Complaint. The defendant often would ig-
nore the papers and default, partly because he has no real defense,
partly because he does not understand, and partly because he has
not then been stung to action by the garnishment. Inevitably the
writ would issue, and, when wages are withheld, the debtor might
well find his hearing date has passed and that the goods were seized
with court permission.21 The point, of course, is that the formal dif-
cific standards for relief. This is exactly what we have now, on an ex
parte basis, with court hearings afforded for unusual cases. Summary
proceedings are available in the appellate courts to give immediate review.
McCall v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 2d 527, 36 P.2d 642 (1934). Injunctions
prevent a truly improper threat of misused writs. Czap v. Credit Bureau
of Santa Clara County, 7 Cal. App. 3d 1, 86 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1st Dist. 1970).
The change from oral testimony to affidavits for use in default judgment
prove-ups permitted by CAL. CODE OF CIV. PRO., § 585(4) (West 1955)
illustrates the benefits of writings over oral hearings in some cases.
One method of proof is not inherently better or more "moral" than an-
other; the issue is just which procedure is more effective in given situa-
tions. The Randone court finds this intolerable because of the delay in-
volved. Still these matters can be heard even more quickly, and some
procedural delays are inevitable in any system.
21. Of course, there could be another hearing at this point, but this
ference between a writ issued based on an ex parte showing and one
after a court hearing is a trivial distinction. That change will not
prevent abuses in this field and might even make matters worse for
all involved.
IV. A NEw APPROACH
The real question is not the proper procedure needed for a writ
to issue; the problem is the use of writs in cases where such reme-
dies are not properly employed or used as bargaining pressures on
the litigants. It is not whether writs require a sworn document or
a noticed hearing. It is not whether one deals with a judge or clerk
or court commissioner. The abuse arises from the evasion of the
limited rights to employ writs, and the response to their misuse
must go to this basic problem. No program, of course, can provide
a perfect remedy. A partial solution appears, however, in those
cases where writs are employed in support of one of several theories
by a plaintiff for relief. The courts should let the lawyer's arsenal
alone and allow litigants to use writs in their suits. However, the
plaintiff's right to win, no matter what the merits of his claim,
should be limited to theories under which the writ employed is
strictly proper. This eliminates all inquiry as to the plaintiff's mo-
tives, and evaluates only his conduct. It will not stop misuse of
writs, but will reduce the cases in which claims allowing writs are
advanced just to have the power of the writ used as a weapon to
enforce a different sort of claim. Thus, if alternative inconsistent
theories exist, and if the plaintiff invokes a writ authorized by just
one particular theory, he must win on that claim or lose his suit.
This would apply even though he might have won upon a different
theory on which he could not have received pretrial relief.
One may complain that this is harsh and will sometimes preclude
a "just" result, as when plaintiffs have been careless, ignorant, or
greedy, or when defendants are more culpable. However, in each
such case the plaintiff has deliberately chosen to use the writ for
his own benefit. He knows-or must be held to know-that his right
only brings matters back to where they started. In Independence Bank v.
Heller, 275 Cal. App. 2d 84, 79 Cal. Rptr. 868 (2nd Dist. 1969; hear. den.)
household furniture worth over $20,000.00 was held exempt based on the
"manner of comfortable living to which" the defendant "has become ac-
customed". This means anything might happen at such a hearing, and it
becomes too speculative to be a matter for effective planning. Maybe the
best solution is to provide public insurance to pay every creditor in full for
debts proved uncollectable from non-exempt assets of an insolvent buyer,
since courts seem resolved to make collecting difficult. The principle is
the same as public indemnity to victims of some crimes. After all, as costs
rise in any field, insurance must be used to spread the risk.
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to an attachment, for example, or a lis pendens, is based on only
certain of his theories. In fact, because of Randone, he will have
actually convinced some judge of his legal right to an attachment,
and not merely filed a printed form in court. He has had the bene-
fit of the theory authorizing writs and now must bear the burden.
By hypothesis he cannot win on the writ's theory. Penalizing the
occasional plaintiff who uses such remedy in good faith because he
thinks the law gives him the right to do so (even though he is wrong
but had another argument that would have won) is a price society
must pay to end a greater evil. We apply rigorous rules mechani-
cally to felonies. We often let a violator free rather than condone
a lawless search or use of tainted testimony, in order to purify
thereby the pretrial methods of our criminal courts. We should do
the same more willingly to end misuse of pretrial remedies in civil
cases, because more people are affected by commercial litigation
than by police procedures. Placing the plaintiff's suit in jeopardy
because he uses unfair tactics is an effective way to control the con-
duct of the bar. It works in other fields, and would help here.
22
The proper purpose of courts is to promote settled rules of busi-
ness conduct which all potential litigants may know and must ac-
cept, so that there is less point to go to court. The outcome of any
22. Justice Traynor could as easily have been speaking of improper
pretrial writs when he said:
If those guarantees were being effectively enforced by other means
than excluding evidence obtained by their violation, a different
problem would be presented .... Experience has demonstrated,
however, that neither administrative, criminal or civil remedies are
effective.... The innocent suffer with the guilty, and we can-
not close our eyes to the effect the rule we adopt will have on the
rights of those not before the court .... There is thus all the
more necessity for courts to be vigilant in protecting these consti-
tutional rights if they are to be protected at all .... Given the
exclusionary rule and a choice between securing evidence by legal
rather than illegal means, officers will be impelled to obey the
law themselves, since not to do so will jeopardize their objectives
• . . [I]f courts respect the constitutional provisions by refusing
to sanction their violation, they will not only command the respect
of law-abiding citizens for themselves adhering to the law, they
will also arouse public opinion as a deterrent to lawless enforce-
ment of the law by bringing just criticism to bear on law en-
forcement officers who allow criminals to escape by pursuing
them in lawless ways.
People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 449-50, 282 P.2d 905, 913-14 (1955).
We now know, from Sniadach, that freedom from excessive use of pre-
trial writs is also a constitutionally protected right. The policy is the
same and the same results should follow.
individual dispute before the courts or the justice and morality of
any party's acts in each specific case should generally be less impor-
tant than supplying fixed standards for commercial conduct. This
is not the goal of courts today. Our courts now aim at "justice" for
each litigant, without regard to settled rules. This demand is so
pervasive that there hardly is a private cause where victory is cer-
tain, or one too wrong to be upheld by claims of "equity". As a re-
sult, every litigant demands "justice" of the court. Morality can
be-and regularly is-invoked to further any act that man per-
forms, no matter how unfair, cruel or oppressive it may be.23 When
tested by "morality", the outcome of every lawsuit is in doubt.
Since either side may win if counsel can successfully maintain the
abstract justice of his client's cause, and since an ethical justifica-
tion can be made for almost anything, there is a powerful incentive
to fight (or to settle) every time. Tactics and the use of oppressive
procedures become increasingly significant as the outcome on the
merits is in doubt.24 One cannot accept a judicial system where
the procedures used have more effect upon the final outcome than
the merits of the cause.
The formal doctrine of election of remedies has long held that use
of any pretrial remedy restricts the plaintiff to a legal theory
countenancing such a writ and, therefore, the "obtaining and levy
of a writ of attachment is an election of a contract remedy and
estops plaintiffs from seeking relief on a tort theory of liability. 2 5
The doctrine of elections, unfortunately, has little viability to-
day. In cases where the theory might apply, a maze of technical
23. Descartes once wrote, "There is nothing we can imagine, however
absurd or incredible, that has not been maintained by one philosopher or
another", quoted in POPPER, supra note 4 at 312. It is only necessary to
consider the intellectual apologists for every dictatorial regime or op-
pressive social practice.
24. R. POUND, TE SPIRIT OF THE CoMMON LAW at 141-42 (1921). "But
the endeavor to make law and morals coincide and to reach an ethical
solution of each particular controversy gives too wide a scope to judicial
discretion so that at first the administration of justice in this stage is too
personal and too uncertain." Pound believed that this stage would soon
be over, when law becomes "mature". However, it has not ended in the
half-century since he lectured us. On the contrary, justice has become
more personal and more uncertain as time has gone by. This has in-
creased the practical importance of the use of oppressive procedures as a
form of blackmail.
25. Barrett v. Hammer Builders, Inc., 195 Cal. App. 2d 305, 316, 16 Cal.
Rptr. 49, 56 (2nd Dist. 1961). Of course the several legal concepts must
be inconsistent. A suit joining independent contract and tort actions is
permissible, and attachment on the contract claim in such a case will not
waive the independent tort. Symcox v. Zuk, 221 Cal. App. 2d 383, 34 Cal.
Rptr. 462 (2nd Dist. 1963; hear. den.)
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distinctions has evolved so that the rule is merely one more tool
a judge may use to come to any end result he wants. It does not
control the tactics of the bar.
Thus, courts have held there can be no election unless the de-
fendant has been "injured or prejudiced" by the plaintiff's acts, and,
accordingly, allowed an action to proceed despite a prior incon-
sistent judgment against a co-defendant 26 or an unsuccessful claim
on funds in court.27  Courts have used quasi-contract theories to
justify attachments for what are, traditionally, tort claims28 and
freely hold that damages allegedly owing from a tort-created "duty"
becomes by law a contract "debt", permitting an attachment. 29
Elections doctrine is held applicable only where the remedy first
sought is properly invoked, and if the "plaintiff is mistaken and
undertakes to avail herself of a remedy to which she is not en-
titled, she is not prevented from subsequently availing herself of
the one to which she is entitled under the facts of the case."
30
Other courts explain that though attachment "elects" for con-
tract doctrines, the fraud may still be used collaterally so as to toll
the bar of limitations applicable upon the contract claim. 1 Courts
only apply elections rules consistently in holding that attachment is
a bar to punitive damages3 2 and even that is far from certain.
33
Most cases in this field arise from use of an attachment when tort
theory also is involved, and what little strength the doctrine has to-
26. Pacific Coast Cheese v. Security First National Bank, 45 Cal. 2d 75,
286 P.2d 353 (1955). In J.C. Peacock, Inc. v. Hasko, 184 Cal. App. 2d 142,
7 Cal. Rptr. 490 (2nd Dist. 1960; hear. den.) the trial court held that an
unsuccessful levy of attachment was not an election.
27. Dickinson v. Electric Corporation, 10 Cal. App. 2d 207, 51 P.2d 205
(2nd Dist. 1935; hear. den.).
28. Steiner v. Rowley, 35 Cal. 2d 713, 221 P.2d 9 (1950).
29. Acme Paper Co. v. Goffstein, 125 Cal. App. 2d 175, 270 P.2d 505
(1st Dist. 1954).
30. Verder v. American Loan Soc., 1 Cal. 2d 17, 33, 32 P.2d 1081, 1087
(1934).
31. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Blade, 139 Cal. App. 2d 580, 294 P.2d 140
(2nd Dist. 1956; hear. den.).
32. Arcturus Manufacturing Corp. v. Rork, 198 Cal. App. 2d 208, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 758 (2nd Dist. 1961; hear. den.).
33. The cases clearly hold attachment is proper in a quasi-contract claim,
and also that quasi-contract permits punitive damages. Ward v. Taggart,
51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959). One can conclude that some court will
permit attachment for the punitive, as well as the compensatory, damages
in such a case.
day is usually shown here. When other pretrial remedies are used,
elections principles are weaker still. This is doubly unfortunate,
as protection from misused pseudo-attachment remedies is greatly
needed.
In one such case, the plaintiff had bought a motel and paid in part
by assigning notes payable to him, and partly by his own new note,
secured by a trust deed on the purchased property. When diffi-
culties later came, he sued in fraud for damages and also for
rescission. Pending trial, the court enjoined defendant from fore-
closure of the purchase money deed of trust, and also from selling
the notes received as the down payment. The plaintiff later
dropped his rescission claim, and won fraud damages at trial. The
court found nothing wrong in this, despite the fact that plaintiff on
the damage claim alone could hardly have enjoined defendant from
selling off the notes assigned to him.84
Another plaintiff sought specific performance of a contract to pur-
chase real property or, alternatively, damages for the vendor's
breach, and recorded a lis pendens. The court upheld a judgment
for his damages, despite the seller's plea that no lis pendens lies in
damage suits, and that the voluntary employment of that remedy
should bar a different basis of recovery.35
V. CONCLUSION
The problem is one of social policy. How do we stop, as much as
any system can, sophisticated counsel from adopting a paper theory
and using pretrial writs available thereunder to put pressure on an
"uncooperative" defendant, who should not, by our public policy, be
harrassed by such a writ, and who may, in fact, not owe the debt
at all? The problem is not whether an act traditionally considered
a tort may also give rise to a contract claim, permitting judgment
either way. The only wrong is when inconsistent theories are ad-
vanced at the same time as means of pretrial pressuring. It is no
34. Lenard v. Edmonds, 151 Cal. App. 2d 764, 312 P.2d 308 (1st Dist.
1957; hear. den.). The injunction against foreclosure is proper on either
theory, since damages offset or pay the debt. The injunction against sale
of the down payment notes, however, must presuppose the right to rescind,
for otherwise the plaintiff had no proper interest in them. The court ig-
nored this problem completely in its opinion.
35. Brandolino v. Lindsay, 269 Cal. App. 2d 319, 75 Cal. Rptr. 56 (2nd
Dist. 1969; hear. den.). Lis pendens is only available in certain limited
statutory cases. CAL. CODE OF CIV. PRO. § 409 (West 1954). Damages for
breach of contract to convey is not among them. Had the suit originally
been just for damages, one cannot doubt the court would have expunged
the notice under CAL. CODE or Civ. PRO. § 409.1 (West 1954).
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help to have another pretrial hearing. That goes to how the plain-
tiff gets his writ, but not the side effects of granting it.
A partial solution lies within elections doctrine. This would work
well where several inconsistent theories are advanced, which do not
all permit the use of a given preliminary writ. The courts should
rule at the outset of each case that when a party voluntarily em-
ploys a pretrial remedy, he thereby abandons rights under any
legal formula which does not clearly authorize the writ. Attach-
ment would preclude recovery when acts are viewed in tort, and
also would not let tort doctrines toll the Statute of Limitations, af-
fect the venue, or even let the plaintiff win at all.36 Using this sys-
tem, Lenard and Brandolino would both have been reversed. This
thinking should be our public policy in this area. Provisional rem-
edies must be available when needed, but their use should be dis-
couraged, because they often are so terribly unfair.
Sniadach and Randone show the right social aspirations, if not a
useful remedy. More hearings, more lawsuits, more judges and
other shopworn remedies will not help. To get results, we must
control the conduct of the bar, because the litigation process rests
within its hands. It is the client, not the judges, who can control
lawyers. The parties to a suit are now rarely concerned with what
is happening. All that they want is victory; attorneys do the rest.
If certain tactics hampered that recovery, the lawyer would become
more responsible.37  Were election rules effectively applied, the
36. James v. P.C.S. Ginning Company, 276 Cal. App. 2d 19, 80 Cal. Rptr.
457 (5th Dist. 1969) involved conflicting rights under an equitable mort-
gage and an intervening homestead. The Court there used elections doc-
trine in accordance with the policy expressed here. Unfortunately, it
seems to have been used as a justification for putting down a manipulative
defendant, rather than as an overriding judicial concept. The policy in that
case can hardly be reconciled with that shown almost simultaneously in
Samuels v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 276 Cal. App. 2d 264,
81 Cal. Rptr. 216 (2nd Dist. 1969; hear. den.) except as another example of
the use of doctrine to promote "justice" in each case, depending on the
side the judges deem proper.
37. The courts will now impose sanctions on a client for a frivolous ap-
peal or an improper law and motion matter, even though in fact everything
is done by the attorney, and the client is only nominally involved. Reber
v. Beckloff, 6 Cal. App. 3d 341, 85 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1st Dist. 1970; hear.
den.). As stated in Romero v. Snyder, 167 Cal. 216, 222, 138 P. 1002, 1004
(1914), "The court may have well believed that the delay was without
reasonable excuse. The neglect of her [plaintiff's] attorneys, if the delay
was due to them, is imputable to her as her own neglect." If attorney's
plaintiff will not often swear out pretrial writs based on a tenuous
theory merely to press a tactical advantage. Faced with loss of a
good claim, and perhaps the only one that might actually prevail,
the claimant will tend to use the writ only in those cases where he
is prepared either to stand squarely upon it or to gamble that the
pressure of the provisional remedy will force the defendant to sur-
render. Clearly, fewer writs would then be used.
There is nothing unfair or unreasonable in this. The starting
point is that defendants, too, have rights. Our established public
policy decrees that they should be left in peaceable possession of
their property until the plaintiff has obtained a judgment. Ran-
done is eloquent on this point, but seems to think there is some
magic in a writ judicially prescribed that cleanses it of all the sins
affecting the same writ when issued merely by a clerk. But this is
not the case. It is the writ, however issued, that does the damage,
and generally the same facts will cause judicial writs to issue as will
coax them from the clerk. Attorneys will present the case for
writs, and, if they are available at all, will get them regularly.
Only if there is a serious penalty imposed on a writ erroneously
issued will this practice stop. A plaintiff does not have to seek a
pretrial writ. He may present his various theories to the court with-
out a writ, wait until he wins a judgment on some theory, and then
proceed with post-trial remedies. To do so, of course, denies him the
benefit of the writ and all the pressures that flow from its use. But
he has no right to use the writ in every case. His voluntary selec-
tion of a provisional remedy must rest upon his firm reliance on
the theory under which it is advanced, not the tactical advantage
from its use.
Strict adherence to elections doctrines will preclude some un-
necessary writs, yet still permit such remedies in cases where the
need for them is great and the propriety is most clear. It will re-
duce one area of abuse. No reform can offer more.
malpractice were easier to prove, greater care in litigation must ensue.
Campbell v. Magana, 184 Cal. App. 2d 751, 8 Cal. Rptr. 32 (2nd Dist.
1960), which holds that a negligent attorney is not liable unless the client
would have won, seems poor social policy, particularly when the out-
come of every lawsuit is so unpredictable. The courts have recently
started dismissing cases for delay in bringing them to trial, and as a re-
sult the plaintiffs' bar has speeded up its work. The same would hap-
pen here.
